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Abstract 
 
Nepal has established community forestry institutions to manage natural resources at the local community level 
under the assumption that there will be better management than under Government agencies. However, 
community forestry has not been entirely successful as it has not addressed the needs of poor and marginalised 
groups. The main goal of this study is to examine how Nepalese social structure guides the structure of the 
Executive Committee (EC) of Community Forestry User Groups and in particular, whether the EC is dominated 
by elite groups that could in turn hinder the needs of poor and marginalised groups. This paper uses data from 
the middle hill district of Baglung, Nepal. Statistical analysis indicates that decision-making is dominated by the 
local elite, who are typically from higher castes, have larger land holdings, and have a higher income. The 
empirical results are expected to suggest policy makers design program for empowering people of low caste, 
poor and lower socio-economic status to create opportunity to be  involved in decision making in order to have 
equal or need based benefits acquired by CF. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Local institutions are very important for developing countries, such as Nepal, where land 
resources to meet basic needs of the people are institutionally and geographically limited 
(FAO, 2002). With inadequate institutions, many people stay poor because they have 
insufficient rights to mange their resources. Neo-classical economic theory, when applied to 
natural resources, typically focusses on technology and efficiency related to development but 
ignores the institutional structures that guide the actions of those involve in the utilisation and 
management of forest resources. However, there has been increasing recognition of the 
importance of institutions as determinants of economic performance. In particular, it is 
important to understand how Community Forestry User Group (CFUG) institutions use their 
decision-making powers and processes because these can have the most significant impact on 
distribution of Community Forestry (CF) benefits. 
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Most show that CF has been successful in increasing forest cover and conserving forest 
resources in the hill districts, however it has not achieved its goal to alleviate poverty (Dhakal 
et al., 2006; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Malla et al., 2005; Pokharel, 2002; Agrawal, 2001). 
CF benefits have flowed less to poor and marginalised households than to elite and wealthy 
households (Adhikari, 2005; Adhikari et al., 2004). There are two schools of thought as what 
is constraining CF from delivering benefits to the poor and alleviating poverty. One school is 
that government policy constraints on resource use, in particular limiting forest management 
and use for environmental goals is the most important factor (Dhakal et al., 2006). Another 
school of thought is that Nepalese social structure, which is based on caste, class, elites and 
higher and lower stratas, is the key factor in limiting the ability of the poor to obtain benefits 
from CF (Iversen et al. 2006; Adhikari, et al. 2007; Jones, 2007; Hansen, 2007; Hobley, 2007; 
Acharya and Gentle, 2005; Adhikari, et al. 2004; Springate-Baginskim et al. 2003, 2007).  
 
In this paper the focus is on the effect of social structure on decision-making arrangements 
and the flow-on effects that this can have on the types of benefits generated under CF, and 
how they are distributed. Power relationships play a major role in decision-making 
concerning natural resource management. Government authorities and local elites have been 
reluctant to transfer power to local poor, and national and international agencies 
implementing CF and Community based natural resource management (CBNRM) have also 
been hesitant to include local poor and marginalised in the decision-making process (Hansen, 
2007). As a result, in many cases decision-making and implementation of CF appears to 
follow historical patterns, where authorities and a powerful elite make decisions, and local 
poor and disadvantaged only participate to a minor extent in decision-making (Samantha, 
2008; Chakarborty, 2001).  
 
Much of the debate over decision making-process strategies in the last two decades has 
therefore revolved around the question of how poverty, vulnerability and access to natural 
resources are linked with economic development of rural poor, and which social structures or 
institutions will best contribute to ensure the flow of benefits to the poor (Baumann et al., 
2003). Central to this discussion has been a consensus that decision-making based on 
proportionate social structure in local communities is an important step towards moving 
natural resource management in the right direction (Jones, 2007; Pokharel and Larsen, 2007; 
Malla et al., 2005; Aquino, et al., 1992). More representative decision-making is believed to 
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be able to bring about decisions based on need, thus contributing towards the livelihoods of 
the poor. 
 
In community forestry the basic institution is the CFUG, which consists of all members who 
meet periodically as an assembly, and an executive committee that takes on key decision-
making roles on behalf of the CFUG. The composition of the committee is thus a critical issue 
in terms of decisions about the use of the community forest.  In principle the executive 
committee should have representation from all members, and thus its decisions will reflect the 
needs and desires of all members. The key question is thus whether membership of the 
executive committee is representative of the membership generally, and if not, what factors 
determine membership of the executive committee.  
 
2.  Elite Theory 
The underlying assumption of the elite theory is that the elites have some attributes different 
from other people in the societies which give them an advantage in taking leadership and 
control over decision making (Aquino et al., 1992). The word elite is derived from the Latin 
Eligere that means to elect. It refers to a relatively small, dominant group in a lager society. 
The elites are different from other people not only in power but also in needs and interests. 
Many elites come from a small group of people engaged in the same activity (Fabricius et al., 
2006).  The background of the elite reinforces their propensity to make decisions that address 
their own needs and interests, which may disadvantage other people (Bruins, 1999). The 
emergence of an elite is the result of economic and political forces within a social structure.   
 
Since Nepalese communities are composed of people with heterogeneity in social powers, 
private resource endowments and community forest product demands, the elite theory may 
explain characteristics of the CFUG decision-making body.  Figure 1 outlines key elements of 
social heterogeneity and decision-making where the elite may be capturing disproportionate 
benefits.   
 
 3
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework 
 
A typical rural community in Nepal is composed of households with heterogeneous attributes. 
In the elite theory, the hypothesis is that people with social power, wealth, education, 
experience in leadership, and landholding and non CFUG political power will be represented 
in and have influence on CFUG institutions. The underlying model is thus that leadership 
roles (Yi) will be some function of particular social attributes (Xij). 
 
Yi =β0 + β j lnXij
j=1
n∑ + e   (1) 
 
Where the subscript i denotes ith observation of the household sample attributes of leadership 
and j denotes the jth observation of the independent variables.  Leadership can be measured in 
a number of ways. One of them is simply to indicate whether a person is an executive 
committee member or not.  This leads to a binary dependent variable (yes or no) and the use 
of logistic regression.   
 
In this research an econometric model was developed to understand the relationship between 
leadership and socioeconomic characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, education, 
landholding size, livestock holdings, wealth status, and non-CFUG leadership or political 
activity.  In addition, it was hypothesized that leadership in Nepalese society can be explained 
by social stratification (caste).  Thus leadership roles can be represented as, 
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Leadership = f (landholding, wealth, livestock holding, caste, education, 
political experience, social status, gender, ethnicity)  (3) 
 
Landholding is an influential factor in the decision-making process to determine distribution 
of benefits from community forestry.  For example, Maskey et al. (2006) found that large 
landholders are likely to get more benefit from community forestry due to their influential 
status and ability to influence the decision-making process. Yadav et al. (2003) found that 
there is a distinctively lower level of satisfaction among small and landless households about 
the benefits they receive from community forests.  Wealth can give greater assurance of social 
status in society and thus has a influence on decision-making.  Wealthier people are more able 
to participate in and influence the outcomes of decision-making processes, and as a result gain 
more benefits from common resources (Lachhepelle et al., 2004).  In the same way, a person 
who has livestock and requires land for grazing their cattle in the CF, has more interest in 
influencing the CFUG decision-making process. Dev et al. (2003) found that the executive 
committee members who have livestock usually decided to graze and collect fodder from 
forest.  
 
Education that provides deep knowledge, skills and thoughts is a power of the leaders that 
enhance their ability to operate a systematic process.  The level of education enhances a 
person’s ability to think logically and choose the best alternative (Daft, 2005; Molians, 1998; 
Montgomery, 1996).  Experience in leadership roles in political organizations also leaders to 
leadership roles in CFUGs, although this can bring conflicting priorities (Mapedza, 2006; 
Andersen and Ostrom, 2007).  Ethnicity, social status and gender play an important role in 
determining leadership positions. Weinberger and Jutting (2001) found that women-only 
CFUGs provide more opportunity for women to participate in decision-making process about 
forest management. Tiwari (2002) found that lower caste, class and ethnicity for both men 
and women means less participation in the decision-making process.  
 
3. Data 
 
Baglung district, situated in the middle hills physiographic zone of Nepal, was selected for the 
study.  The main occupation in rural areas is subsistence agriculture. The rural population is 
scattered in small villages or hamlets that are surrounded by a patchwork of rain-fed 
agricultural land.  Forest land varies in size and is frequently found in small patches around 
agricultural land and on steep slopes.  A random selection of 31 CFUGs was done based on 
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the information from the District Forest office, and the District Level Community Forestry 
User Group Federation (FECOFUN) of Baglung.   
 
The data were collected using structured questionnaires from two groups, current executive 
committee members of CFUGs and heads of the households of non-executive CFUG 
members.  With the assistance of the CFUG executive, the household sample was divided into 
four income groups, poorest, poor, medium and rich household income groups. Generally, 
these household groups will also represent the different ethnic groups and castes.  The data 
collected in the questionnaires, summarised in Table 1 and 2, covers household income, 
involvement in the EC and NGOs, information about forest product collection in the past year 
and demographics factors including ethnicity, landholding, livestock endowment and food 
sufficiency.   
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Table 1: Definition and Description of Variables 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
 Descriptions of variables 
NowAnyEC 
 
NowKeyEC 
 
AnytiECm 
AnytiKec 
 
 
 
 
• Household member working as a member in any position of 
current EC of forest user group 
• Household member working in key positions (chairperson,  
vice-chairperson, secretary and treasure) of current EC 
• Household member in any EC position (previous or current) 
• Household member in any key EC position (previous or 
current) 
Land Resources relat
independent  
Variables 
Expected 
 Sign 
 
BariRout - Area (ropani) of upland (non-irrigated land) rented out 
KhetRout - Area (ropani) of lowland rented out 
KarRout - Area (Ropani) of Grasses land with some trees rented out 
ButRout - Area (ropani) of marginal land with trees or grass production rented 
out 
OwnBari + Area (ropani) of upland (non-irrigated land)  
OwnKhet + Area (ropani) of lowland (irrigated land) 
OwnKhar + Area (ropani) of upland (non-irrigated land) 
OwnBut 
Logland 
LogSqlnd 
+ 
- 
- 
Area (ropani) of marginal land with trees or grass production 
Log of total land area (ropani) 
Log square of total land area  
Social structure related independent variables 
CastElit 
NGOmem 
RichHH 
MHH 
HhPoor 
Gender 
HHedAge 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
If caste elite (Bahun, Chhetry,Newar and Thakury) 1 other wise 0 
If any household member is a member in NGO 1, other wise 0 
If the household is defined rich by user groups 1  other wise 0 
If the household is defined medium by user groups 1  other wise 0 
If the household is defined Poor by user groups 1  other wise 0 
If  sex of respondents male 1 otherwise 0 
Household head age in years  
Eduyear 
EDucSQ 
Service 
 
Teacher 
- 
- 
   - 
 
- 
Education in years 
Education square 
If house hold member has government or other service 1 other 
wise 0  
If household member teacher 1 other wise 0 
Livestock related independent Variables 
CowNo 
GoatN 
Buffalo 
TLivUnit 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
No of cows in a household 
No of Goats in a household 
No of Buffalos in a household 
Total livestock unit 
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Table 2:  Income and food related independent variables 
 
Foodsur 
 
Food12m 
 
Food 6m 
 
Food 3 m 
 
Casincom 
Off Farminc 
Casincomservice 
Totalcas 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
If food production is sufficient from home consumption 1 
otherwise 0 
If consumption for 12 months in a year 1, other wise 0 
If food production is sufficient for home consumption for 6 
months in a year 1, other wise 0 
If food production is sufficient for home consumption for 3 
months in a year 1, other wise 0 
Total cash income (in rupees) 
If off farm income source 1, other wise 0 
If income source from service 1, other wise 0 
Total cash income (Nepalese rupees) 
 CF Resources related independent variables 
CF Area (hac) 
Timber area(hac) 
Pole area 
Below pole area 
Distance in km 
CFUG Age 
Forest age 
Fortype C 
ForType B 
Fortype M 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ - 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
Forest area in Hectares 
Forest area in Hectares 
Area in Hectares 
Area in Hectares 
Distance in Kilometres 
No of years of Handed over 
Forest area in Hectares 
Forest type conifer 
Forest Broad leaf 
Forest Mixed  species 
 
4. Results 
 
The results are divided into two sections.  The first section provides descriptive statistics of 
the CFUGs that were surveyed.  The second section presents the results of the logit 
regression.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
A total of 310 households and executive committee members were surveyed in the 31 
CFUGs. Household range is in size from 2 to 18, with an average of 7 persons. Rich 
household are 18.6% of total households, medium households 42%, poor households 22.2 and 
poorest households 18.38 of total households. 
 
Similarly the Bari (land around the home area), khet (Suitable for Rice and wheat growing), 
kharBari (suitable for grass and fodder tree growing) and Butyan (Suitable for trees crops) 
whether is own or rented. As can seen following in Table 3 the average land holding, Table 4 
Land holding and Livestock by Wellbeing Category and Table 5: Food Sufficiency. 
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Table 3:  Average land holding 
 
Land type  Own land (hectares) Rented 
(hectares) 
Bari 0.004 0.042 
Khet 0.098 0.12 
Kharbari 0.16 0.012 
Butyan 0.15 0.01 
Total .415 0.184 
  
Table 4: Land holding and Livestock by Wellbeing Category 
 
 Rich % Medium % Poor % Poorest % 
Households 
(N) 
57 18.6 127 41 69 22.2 57 18.38 
Land 
Holding 
(Ha) 
1.41 18.39 0.9 40.97 0.48 22.25 .28 18.39 
Live Stock 
(N) 
4 50 3 37 1 12 0 0 
 
Table 5: Food Sufficiency 
 
Income group No of Households Percent (%)  
Rich 59 19 Food surplus 
Medium 109 35 Sufficient for 12 months 
Poor 55 18 Sufficient for 6 months 
Poores 87 28 Sufficient for 3months 
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 Social structural Category  of members in EC 
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The Figure 2 shows the Rich household members, Poor household and female members in EC 
in 31 CFUGs in Baglung 
 
In Figure 2 indicates that rich household members in EC of CFUGs have been leading to the 
poor and female members of EC in decision-making. Similarly, in Figure 3 elite caste 
members indicate paramount and majority in compare to Dalit in EC.  Hence naturally they 
influence in the deciding-making outcomes. The poor, oppressed and women group are 
always suffered by decision-making and there may have virtual problem for them to raise 
their voice in decision-making in EC and assembly meetings that have a greater chance of 
decision take unfavoured of these sections of Nepalese society. 
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The following Figure 3 shows the Total members, Elite Caste members and Dalit (Lower 
Caste) members in 31 CFUGs in Baglung 
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While analysing of the wellbeing category of households and their representation on EC of 
CFUGs, wealthier household representation is 17.85 % of the total surveyed household 
population but they were represented 52.12 % on the EC of CFUGs. In contrast, the poorest 
household 13.88% of those surveyed were under representative with only 3.68 % of all the 
Executive committees’ households as Figure 4 illustrated. These results are similar with 
results of Adhikari et al. (2006) and Thoms (2008).  
Category of Households wellbeing Classes
17.85
39.32
28.95
13.88
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Figure 4: Households well being category in CFUGs 
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Representation of Well being category 
on EC of CFUGs
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Figure 5 shows the well being category of Households members on CE of CFUGs 
 
While compare the caste and their caste based members in Baglung District level (Figure 6) 
and surveyed Executive Committee (EC) members of CFUGs level (Figures 7) it shows that 
lower caste and low socio-economics ethnic representative in proportionally are significantly 
lower in EC   of CFUGs than the caste living in Baglung District level (Figure 6). 
 12
41.4
27.7
13.1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Percent (%)
Categories of Caste?Ethnic Groups
Representation of Caste/Ethnic Groups in Baglung District
Elite Caste Janjati Caste Dalit Caste
 
Figure 6: Proportion Percent of Caste/Ethnic Groups in Baglung District Level (Data source: 
District profile Baglung, Nepal) 
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Figure: 7: shows the Caste/Ethic households members presentation in EC of CFUGs 
 
Community Forestry (CF) description 
 
After endorsement of “Forest Act 1993 and regulation 1995” by the government which shifted 
nationalized forests from state control to local communities. More than 15,000 “Community 
Forest User Groups” (CFUGs) have been formed in Nepal to manage 25 percent o f Nepal’s 
forestland. Among forest covers about 4.27 million hectares (29%) and shrub covers 1.56 
million hectares (10.6%) of a total land area of 14.72 million hectares of Nepal (Nagendtra et 
al., 2008; NPC; 2007). 
 
The forest area of the district is 98046 ha whereas coniferous forest is of 16486.10 ha 
(16.81%) and hard wood forest 50757 ha (51.77%). Mixed forest is 23186.20 (23.64%). 
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Shrub land   is 7565.30 ha (7.71%) and other forestland 51.00 (0.05). Up to the Fiscal Year, 
059/060 total 2158.96 ha forest has been hand over to 322 CFUGs for 37674  households 
(DFO, 2004).The characteristics of forest resources of the sample  community forestry are 
mainly coniferous forests particularly south facing  dominated by Chirpine (Pinus roxburghii)   
between 1000-2200m and few their  associated species. Similarly broad leave forests are 
composed with 
 
Shorea robusta, Schima walichaii and Castanopsis indica. Riverine forests come  across of 
Toona (Cedrela toona) and Albizia procera low land along the river sides. Mixed forests 
associated with broad leave and coniferous subsist in eco-tone area. 
 
The per capita forest area is 0.36 hectare in Baglung whereas in National level 0.26 hectare. In 
the study area, per capita forestland is 0.022 hectare. The forest area per household is 0.25 
hectare in the study area whereas as national level average is 0.2-hectare 
precipita(Dhakal,2005). 
 
5.2  Logit Model Results 
 
The logistic regression model looks at the relationship between leadership and demographic 
characteristics of individual household heads.  There were four different dependent variables 
tested, currently an EC member (Model 1), currently a key EC member (Model 2), past or 
current EC member (Model 3), and past or current key EC member (Model 4).  For each 
model, there were 44 explanatory variables loaded in the first step of the binary logit analysis 
(Table 3).  As suggested by Agresti and Finlay (1999) and Kleinbaum (1994), the least 
significant explanatory variable was deleted in a step by step process until the model was 
stable.  Since variable deletion creates a nested model, model stability was examined by using 
the Chi-square test for significance difference of -2log likelihood ratios.  The following 
discussion looks at the results of the final models. 
 
Model 1 Current EC Member 
 
The results of Model 1 in Table 3 show that the key factors that determine current 
membership on the EC are as follows: 
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Table 3 Factors that determine current membership on the EC 
 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
HH no. in CFUG -0.082 0.017 .000+ 
Occupation is a farmer 0.872 0.309 .005+ 
MedHNo 0.071 0.017 .000+ 
Occupation is a teacher -1.599 0.651 .014+ 
Political power -1.095 0.367 .003+ 
KhetRented out 0.77 0.328 .019** 
RichHNo 0.078 0.018 .000+ 
PoorHhN 0.052 0.017 .000+ 
LogGoatu -2.016 0.813 .003+ 
NGOmem 0.644 0.305 .035** 
LogRPro 12.04 2.53 .000+ 
Castelit 0.181 0.083 .028** 
DalitHH -1.03 0.44 .018** 
LogCowUt 2.741 1.194 .022** 
Janprop -8.474 2.25 .000+ 
OwnBut 0.086 0.046 .063* 
Hhsize 0.106 0.056 .059** 
AgeHHh -0.138 0.065 .034** 
LoageHh 11.23 5.98 .061* 
LgageHHh 12.541 6.148 .041** 
RichProp 8.656 2.87 .003+ 
LgMHhN 6.868 1.52 .000+ 
Constant -15.92 7.236 .028** 
 
Chi-square    109.118 
Cox and Snell R2    .300 
Nagelkarke     R2   .406 
-2LogLikelihood 297.585 
Chi Squared Probability  .0000 
Number of Observation 310 
 
Note: * indicates statistically significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 
1%percentage. 
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Model 2 Current key EC Member 
 
The results of Model 2 in Table 4 show that the key factors that determine current key roles in 
the EC are as follows: 
 
Table 4 factors that determine current key roles in the EC 
 
Variables B S.E Sig. 
HH no. in CFUG -0.072 0.027 .008+ 
Occupation is a farmer 0.807 0.397 .042** 
MedHNo 0.067 0.026 .011+ 
Occupation is a teacher -1.82 1.253 0.145 
Politpow -1.671 0.516 .001+ 
RichHNo 0.053 0.028 .057* 
PoorHhN 0.064 0.029 .027** 
Polearea 0.074 0.024 .002+ 
BelParea -0.045 0.019 .019** 
Lglandow 1.41 0.501 .005+ 
Food12m 1.411 0.428 .001+ 
LgAniSer -0.243 0.097 .012+ 
GoatNo 0.263 0.149 .077* 
Timbarea 0.263 0.149 .077* 
Distkm 0.132 0.046 .004+ 
Logdiskm 2.17 0.91 .017** 
Constant -0.995 0.603 .099* 
 
Chi-square    55.382 
Cox and Snell R2    .184 
Nagelkarke     R2   .340 
-2LogLikelihood 190.560 
Chi Squared Probability  .000 
Number of Observation 310 
 
Note: * indicates statistically significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 
1%percentage. 
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Model 3 Past or Current EC Member 
 
The results of Model 3 in Table 5 show that the key factors that determine past or current 
membership on the EC are as follows: 
 
Table 5 factors that determine past or current membership on the EC 
 
Variables B S.E Sig. 
HH no. in CFUG -2.29 0.498 .000+ 
Occupation is a farmer 0.616 0.273 .024+ 
MedHNo 0.013 0.004 .005+ 
Occupation is a teacher -1.068 0.555 .054** 
Politpow -0.706 0.307 .022** 
KhetRout 0.84 0.402 .037** 
JanjatHH 0.026 0.006 .000+ 
LogGoatu -1.49 0.688 .030** 
NGOmem 0.817 0.28 .004+ 
LogRPro 5.709 1.34 .000+ 
Castelit 3.865 2.01 .054** 
MedHhN 0.013 0.005 .010+ 
LogRchN 1.208 0.498 .016** 
Lganothr -0.181 0.106 .086* 
LogBufUt 2.103 0.935 .025** 
LogRchNo -1.208 0.498 .016** 
Timbarea 0.285 0.091 .002*** 
Logothin -0.208 0.107 .052** 
Constant 5.702 1.55 .000+ 
 
Chi-square    66.073 
Cox and Snell R2    .213 
Nagelkarke     R2   .286 
-2LogLikelihood 363.626 
Chi Squared Probability  .000 
Number of Observation 310 
 
Note: * indicates statistically significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 
1%percentage. 
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Model 4  Past or Current key EC Member 
 
The results of Model 4 in Table 3 show that the key factors that determine past or current key 
roles on the EC are as follows: 
 
Table 6  Factors that determine past or current key roles on the EC 
 
Variables B S.E Sig. 
HH no. in CFUG -0.185 0.06 .002+ 
Occupation is a farmer 0.841 0.417 .043** 
MedHNo 0.174 0.06 .004+ 
KhetRout 1.23 0.324 .000+ 
JanjatHH 0.118 0.039 .003+ 
RichHNo -1.003 0.617 0.104 
PoorHhN 0.169 0.057 .003+ 
LogGoatu -3.589 1.31 .006** 
NGOmem 0.896 0.435 .039** 
LogRPro 9.028 1.91 .000+ 
DalitHH -1.596 0.917 .082* 
LogCowUt 11.309 3.468 .001+ 
Polearea -0.304 0.128 .017+ 
BelParea -0.086 0.033 .010+ 
Lglandow 0.357 0.139 .010+ 
Food12m 1.176 0.491 .017** 
MedHhN 0.026 0.006 .000+ 
Janprop -14.63 5.472 .007+ 
OwnKhet 1.186 0.441 .015** 
Maritst -1.506 0.656 .022+ 
BufNo -1.194 0.415 .004+ 
Constant -9.471 3.94 .016+ 
 
Chi-square    136.764 
Cox and Snell R2    .388 
Nagelkarke     R2   .576 
-2LogLikelihood 181.624 
Chi Squared Probability  .000 
Number of Observation 310 
 
Note: * indicates statistically significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 
1%percentage. 
 
 
Across all models, a number of household characteristics appear consistently (three or more 
models) as a determining factor.  These include, 
 
- Number of households in a CFUG 
- Occupation is a farmer (+) 
- Medium HhNo (+) 
- Politpow (-) 
- KhetRout (+) 
- PoorHhN (+) 
- LogGoatu (-) 
- NGOmem (+) 
 19
- LogRPro (+) 
- Caste elite (+) 
 
The number of households in a CFUG is negatively correlated with a leadership position.  
Opportunities for selection as the leader for the group increases as the size of the group decreases.  
and selection conflict and problems increase as the size of the group increase.  Another 
explanation of this result is that if there is small group size, it creates frequent interactions create 
opportunities to build reputations for any individual (Adhiari and Di Falco, 2008; Poteete and 
Ostrom, 2002). 
 
An occupation as a farmer is correlated to leadership because these people are most likely to 
be involved in a CFUG and rely on it for a portion of their income.  As a result they have an 
incentive to be involved in decision-making.  In particular, medium income farmers, who can 
only just manage to produce sufficient food for a year from their own land, are most likely to 
be in a leadership postion. 
 
The NGO member is statistically significant at the 1 to 4% level in three models (shows 
table3). This indicates that the higher the average number of NGO members in the EC of the 
CFUGs the lower the likelihoods of the benefits for poor household obtained from the CF.  
The basic hypothesis is that if person is a member in NGO/CBO, there is a high probability to 
a member of EC. NGO might have developed leadership capacity or motivated to be a leader. 
Policy implication of this finding is if poor and oppressed lower caste has got opportunity to 
develop their leadership capacity, they could be more in representative of EC and build the 
decision in their favour. This result is similar to the result of Agrawal and Gupta (2005) and 
Maskey et al, (2006), NGO oriented CFUG emphasis more effectively to select leader from 
poor household. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether there are socio-economic factors that 
effectively limit membership on the executive committee of CFUGs in Nepal to the social 
elite in the community.  The results show that richer and higher caste household members 
have a higher probability of being on the executive committee or one of its key members.  
 
The importance of these results is in the flow on effect that elite dominance can have on 
decisions regarding resource use.  A number of studies have found that the wealthier and local 
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powerful elite tends to maximise it own benefits from CF and natural resource management 
(Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Adhikari et al., 2004; Adhikari and Di Falco, 2006; Ostrom, 
2005). 
 
The results of this research are particularly very relevant and significant in the context of 
policy implication that exploited the poor segment of Nepalese society. The users, who get 
opportunity to be a member of NGO/CBO, also get opportunity become skilled at how 
leaderships are holding in decision-making and make fair decision in favour of poor and 
disadvantaged households. Agrawal and Gupta (2005) pointed out that elite domination issues 
are potentially in local decision making everywhere could easily observe. The poor group, 
who rented in land from richer and elite household, do not get opportunity to participate in EC 
decision-making. Hence, they  do not get opportunity  to put forward their needs in EC, thus 
they get less benefit from CF. Moreover, the  wealthy and higher caste elite  who rented  their 
land to the poor  they have most likely  to holding  the leaderships of CFUG. This result is 
extremely important for policy implication that the richer and wealthy higher caste elite 
rented out their land, dominant the poor, hence poor do not get opportunity to improve their 
socioeconomic status and leadership as well. 
 
The empirical results indicate more imperative to policy implications and conclude to secure 
higher attachment in EC that turned more benefit to poor from CF. Most significant to 
enhance the involvement of poor, lower caste, and oppressed group in EC is need to take 
advantage of their lower opportunity cost and time. They may have more penalties if they 
participate in EC such as for frequently meeting and regular attendance. The involvement of 
poor and oppressed group in decision making is only successful if the government secures the 
involvement of poor and socially oppressed lower caste in decision making of EC that flow 
more equitable and needs based benefits to these people. Hence, it promotes the good 
governance and local democracy and humanitarian decision making as well.  
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